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PART I: PRIVATE LAW
TORTS
by
Page Keeton*
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Intangible Commercial Losses. While some courts have apparently applied strict tort liability concepts to claims for intangible commercial
losses resulting from alleged defects and conditions that prevent products
from being as effective as contemplated,1 the better view, it seems, is
to regard all such claims as coming within the purview of the Uniform
Commercial Code, as passed by the Texas legislature.! Jurisprudentially,
it is difficult to understand how the Code can be ignored in dealing with
such claims. Those who drafted the Code doubtless contemplated that
the obligations imposed by law for commercial losses, without respect to
fault, were exclusively contained in the Code. Therefore, if additional
obligations are to be imposed, it should be done by the legislature. At
common law the terms of the contract, and not tort law, controlled the
nature of the obligations between seller, buyer, and third parties for
these business losses and others arising from the fact that a product simply
would not do what it was supposed to do. The question of whether or
not a risk of loss for physical harm should be allocated to the seller rather
than the buyer is an utterly different problem.
It is for the above reasons that I believe Melody Home Manufacturing
Co. v. Morrisona represents a start in the right direction. The action was
for damages caused by alleged defects in a house trailer. The allegations
were that the trailer leaked, the floor buckled, and all the faucets leaked;
for these and other reasons, it was contended that the trailer was worthless. The court held that the better reasoned cases' did not extend the
doctrine of strict liability in tort, as applied in several Texas cases when
physical harm was caused, to claims for intangible economic losses resulting
from unfitness or inefficacy of products. Principles related to the law
of sales should be applicable. This means that there are two basic warranties to be concerned with-the warranty of merchantability under section 2-3146 and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean, University of Texas
School of Law.
'See, e.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karagheurian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
2TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.101-9.507 (1968).
3455 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).

"Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217
Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
'Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.,
416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
6
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (1968).
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section 2-315.' I am not here concerned about what result should be
adopted with respect to a variety of problems, but I am pleading for the
adoption of the practice of looking to the Uniform Commercial Code for
the adjudication of claims of this nature. In this manner ambiguity and
uncertainty can be avoided. If the Code needs revision, then let it be revised.
But issues related to claims based on the inferiority of products are utterly
different from claims based on the dangerousness of products. While the
rules for recovery should be the same in most instances, there are good
reasons for distinguishing. The court in Melody stated that privity of
contract should be required. While I do not believe that marketing privity
should be required, I do think the question of whether third parties who
are not parties to the contract should recover for consequential losses
arising from inferior products or products that do not work as contemplated should be governed by the law of contracts.!
Design Defects. Much uncertainty exists in the law with respect to a claim
arising from physical harm suffered by the user, and those in the vicinity
of use, from a product that was made exactly as it was intended to be
made. When the product is found to be defective, in the sense that it is
different from what it was intended to be because of some miscarriage
in the manufacturing process, the law is now clear. The maker is strictly
accountable But when the claim is based on the ground that all products
similar to the one in question involve an inherent risk such as that which
resulted in harm to the plaintiff, the ambit of responsibility remains quite
unclear. As the law now stands the notion that there is strict liability in
such a case is largely a myth. This is primarily because most courts have
seen fit to hold that a maker shall not be liable for harm resulting from
a risk or danger arising from the use of products until such a risk or
danger becomes scientifically knowable. 0 The problem is most frequently
presented with respect to drugs and cosmetics-products intended for
intimate bodily use. It is a well-known fact that almost any drug or
cosmetic will inevitably harm some people, even when utmost care is
exercised by all concerned-maker, distributor, doctor, and patient or
other user.
A few courts, in dealing with cosmetics, have held that an allergic
victim can recover on proof that he is a member of an appreciable class
of persons who are allergic to some ingredient in the product, provided
such was a known scientific fact." This is what was called an "abreaction"
7Id. § 2.315.
8The Uniform Commercial Code is neutral as regards the necessity for marketing privity.
The issue of whether or not third parties and non-users can recover for harm resulting from defective products is questioned by § 2.318 entitled 'Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Expressed or Implied." In Texas, the legislature concluded to say that they were neutral on the question as to when third parties could recover, leaving the law on this subject to be developed by
the courts. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODe ANN. § 2.318 (1968).
9 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
I'See, e.g., Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Keeton, Torts, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 3, 8 (1970).
11See, e.g., Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
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in Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrill,Inc." This must be a term known only
in Texas, and it has not contributed to the solution of problems in this
area. It is the only drug case of which I am aware applying this special
and peculiar terminology. In nearly all the cosmetic cases on this subject,
the maker had not attempted to give adequate warning to users, and so
the precise question was whether or not liability should be imposed on
the maker for marketing a product known to involve a risk of harm to
an appreciable number of persons without taking adequate measures to give
any warning." So perhaps Cudmore stands for the same proposition as to
drugs; namely, that the maker is subject to liability if he fails to warn
the user about a risk when it is known, or should be known in the exercise of ordinary care, that an appreciable number are allergic. Is this
anything more than saying that it is negligence as a matter of law to
market a drug or a cosmetic without taking adequate steps to give notice
to users?
These problems were involved in Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan.'4 There,
the court stated that appellant owed no duty to Mrs. Morgan to warn
her of the dangerous effects of using New Dawn (a hair dye), because
there was no evidence that she belonged to an appreciable class of potential users of New Dawn who are allergic to it. I do not believe that the
issue of liability should be regarded as conclusively determined even if
it can be established that an appreciable number will be affected. Nor
do I believe that the maker should be conclusively relieved of liability
simply because the plaintiff has failed to establish an appreciable number.
If strict liability is applicable at all to design conditions, then the maker
has a duty to market the product in such a way as to avoid subjecting
users to an unreasonable risk of harm, whether or not he realized it or
should have realized it. I submit that the question in every case should
be whether or not a reasonable man, having such knowledge as exists
at the time of trial regarding the risks and utility of a particular product,
would market the same, and, if so, would he have taken greater precautions
in the light of what was known at the trial regarding the risks. Thus,
a slight risk of harm to a very small segment could be enough to condemn
the product simply because of the availability of substitutes with different
ingredients involving less risk.
Lessors. Frequently in connection with the sale and distribution of products, especially petroleum products, the seller will lease to the purchaser
equipment to receive and store the products. Thus, in Freitasv. Twin City
Fisherman'sCooperative Association" the court was faced with a number
of questions relating to an accident which resulted in injury to a third
person on the leased property, a Gulf Oil Co. tank used for the storage
of diesel fuel. The tank and its ladder were leased to a cooperative associ2 398 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1965), error ref. n.r.e.

"sSee, e.g., Merrill v. Beaute Vires Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956); Howard v. Avon

Prods., Inc., 395 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1964).
14444 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
'5 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970).
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ation furnishing a variety of services to shrimpers. The court held that
the doctrine of strict liability did not apply to the lessor, Gulf, since it
was not in the business of leasing equipment, leasing being merely incidental to the sale of products. This means that any defect in the gasoline
sold will result in the application of strict liability, whereas any defect
in the equipment used to supply the gasoline will not. The court distinguished Frietas from the situation of one engaged in leasing cars and
trucks, as was the case in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Service.1" However, the holding in Frietas is in conflict with a recent
California case. In Price v. Shell Oil Co." plaintiff sustained injuries as a
result of falling from a ladder attached to a gasoline truck used to fuel
airplanes. The defendant owner had leased the truck to plaintiff's employer,
the airline. In applying strict liability, the California court rejected the
notion that Cintrone did not apply. There was evidence to show that
the defendant made ten or more similar arrangements. However, as in
Frietas, the lease arrangement was nonetheless incidental to the sale of
petroleum products.
II.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

I observed last year that there can be little justification for a trial
court to direct a verdict after all the evidence has been admitted."8 Rather,
the case should be submitted to the jury, and if the jury finds an issue
of fact in a way that the trial judge or the appellate court feels is unsupportable under the evidence, a retrial will not be required. This is one
of the two questions involved in Lenger v. Physician's General Hospital,
Inc." In that case a colon resection was performed on a patient, and the
two ends of the colon were sutured together following the operation.
Thereafter, they came completely apart. Gas and fecal material entered
the abdominal cavity and serious complications followed. There was proof
of hospital negligence causally related to the plaintiff's eating solid food
contrary to medical instructions. An expert witness gave several possible
causes of the opening in the meso-colon, including: (1) failure of the
stitches to hold; (2) tension on the suture lines; and (3) the solid food
that was eaten. While the opinion does not mention the point, it seems
clear from other cases involving sutures that one reason stitches may
not hold is because of professional negligence of the doctor, which can
occur when the stitches are too tight or too far apart, or there is negligence
in moving patients. Anyone who has witnessed patients being moved can
understand that the latter can be true. The court in Lenger concluded that
because the expert witness stated that "It's just as reasonable one thing
could have caused it as another,"' there was insufficient evidence to submit the question to the jury. The fact is that the witness was not perN.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
17466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
I1Keeton, supra note 10, at 11.
19455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1970).
See, e.g., Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
1845

t455 S.W.2d at 707.
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mitted to testify to the jury at the trial, and it is not clear what the precise
testimony would have been following direct and cross examination. In
the medical malpractice area, where evidence is so difficult to obtain, I
would be inclined to agree with the view that when there is evidence
of a probable cause as to negligence, the jury should be allowed to determine whether it was the cause, i.e., whether it is more probable than not
that it was the cause. Moreover, if negligence of someone in treating the
patient was more likely than not the cause, then both the hospital and the
doctor should be held responsible unless evidence is produced by one of
them to identify the particular cause."
III. OcculriRS oF LAND

Licensees. I have purposely directed attention in each of the annual
Surveys on Torts to any case that involves the distinction between a licensee and an invitee and the differences between the occupier's duty of
care to each. As stated last year," the law of Texas as to the exact nature
of the duty of care of a licensee has not been clearly articulated. The
Texas supreme court has clarified, through Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.,'A the open-and-obvious-danger concept insofar as invitees are
concerned. But the position of the licensee with respect to injuries from
dangerous conditions encountered without actual awareness of the danger
has yet to be clarified. Two additional cases reported this year illustrate
the uncertainties.
In Olshan Demolishing Co. v. Burleson'e the court, citing a Tennessee
case," labeled any kind of hidden, dangerous condition a trap, and observed by way of dictum that the occupier would be liable. While the
court concluded that the plaintiff in the case should be regarded as an
invitee rather than a licensee, it was favorably disposed to the hidden
danger rule. If such a rule were adopted, then the troublesome distinction
between licensees and invitees could be abolished. On the other hand, in
St. Clergy v. Northcutte, the same court concluded that a social guest
could not recover for harm suffered when she fell after slipping on a
throw rug on a waxed floor, because there was no genuine issue of fact as
to gross negligence. It is true that these two cases are substantially different,
since one involved a latent dangerous condition and the other involved
a condition, the danger of which could be regarded as just as obvious to
the user as to the occupier. As noted last year, s the distinctions between
licensees and invitees have been abolished in California and Hawaii, and
I submit they should be abolished everywhere. If a person enters upon
22

See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See also Dement v. OlinMathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960), for a similar problem involving res ipsa
loquitur.
23Keeton, supra note 10, at 6.
24371

S.W.2d 368

(Tex.

1963).

2* 452 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970).
1Walker v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 195, 384 S.W.2d 447

27448 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
Keeton, supra note 10, at 7.

28

(1964).
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business property rightfully, then he is without fault, regardless of whether
he is there for his own convenience or for that of the occupier, and there
is no justification for relieving the occupier of the responsibility of exercising ordinary care with reference to all such persons.

Liability of Occupier for Misconduct of Third Persons. Generally
speaking, a person is under no duty to protect another from the misconduct
of third persons. However, it is quite clear that a common carrier, an
innkeeper, or an operator of a theatre or other place of amusement or
entertainment is under a duty to take such precautions as a reasonable
man would take to prevent harm to patrons from the misconduct of
others on the premises.29 I think one reason for the reluctance of the courts
to create duties of affirmative action has to do with causation. When a
person fails to do something that he ought to have done in order to prevent harm, the causal question is whether the action that he should have
taken would have prevented harm. The issue is not what did happen, but
what would have happened if proper action had been taken. Even when
it is clear what such action should have been, and often several different
measures could have been taken, any one of which would have satisfied
due care requirements, no one can say what effect the action would have
had in the given situation. This was the problem in East Texas Theatres,
0 In
Inc. v. Rutledge."
that case a theatre patron was hit with a bottle
thrown from the balcony. The supreme court accepted the jury's finding
that there was negligence in failing to take action to control a rowdy
crowd, but it concluded that there was a complete lack of proof that
the bottle would not have been thrown even if such action had been
taken. If the evidence in the record must show that proper precautions
would have more likely than not prevented the occurrence, this result
is sound. But I think the real question here is whether an enterpriser
who negligently allows people to misconduct themselves should be held
accountable for all that happens, or whether patrons who attend in the
expectation of receiving proper care should be required to bear the loss
because of an inability to prove a causal relationship. I admit to some
uncertainty, but there is good reason to argue that if failure to take precautions substantially increased the likelihood of the event, or something
similar occurring, then the enterpriser should be held liable. Perhaps the
affinity of causal likelihood between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
injury should not be the same for all kinds of problems. There are different
policy considerations.'
Slip-and-Fall Cases. The hazards of litigating slip-and-fall situations
are well illustrated in three cases decided during the course of the year.
One involved a customer who fell when the heel of her shoe got caught
" See Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 95 N.W.2d 657 (1959); Marek v. Southern
Enterprises, Inc., 128 Tex. 377, 99 S.W.2d 594 (1936).
30453 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1970).
" See the excellent article by Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60
(1956).
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in a small rug. The plaintiff was denied recovery by the supreme court,
with two judges dissenting, on the ground that there was no evidence to
justify a finding that the condition was unreasonably dangerous." A second case involved a fall in a supermarket on Icee, a flavored, carbonated
ice product. The court of civil appeals correctly reversed a trial court
judgment for the defendant and rendered for plaintiff, since there was
a finding of negligence of the defendant and a further finding that plaintiff did not see the slippery floor, however obvious it should have been
to a person who was looking where he was going." The third involved
a fall by a seventy-nine-year-old woman as she slipped from one level to
another in the Harris County domed stadium.The court of civil appeals,
with one judge dissenting, concluded that recovery should be allowed,
since the jury found that the depth of the step created more than an
ordinary risk of harm to the plaintiff." In all three cases, there was much
discussion about the open-and-obvious-danger concept. The litigation in
this area has confirmed a conviction that I have had for some time-these
cases should be tried as simple issues of negligence and contributory negligence or pursuant to an objective test of whether or not the danger of
the condition would be appreciated by one who was looking where he
was going.
IV.

TRAFFIC

Proximate Cause. It would aid thinking about proximate cause if everyone would recognize something that cannot be denied: there is no such
thing as negligence in the air. Negligence is unreasonably dangerous conduct. It is by definition conduct which a reasonable man would not have
committed because of the magnitude of the harm that was reasonably
foreseeable from such conduct. The failure of trial courts to refer in
their definition of negligence to the fact that negligence is conduct from
which harm is reasonably foreseeable, contributes to much of the confusion about this subject. Even though an actor has been found to have
been negligent, there are at least three reasons why, under the substantive
law, such negligence may not be a proximate cause. First, it may not be
a cause at all. The damaging event may be something that would have
occurred even if defendant had not been negligent. Secondly, the damaging event that resulted from the negligence may have been so different in
kind from that which the defendant was negligent in failing to guard
against, that he should be treated as if he were not at fault. The law is,
right or wrong, that a negligent defendant is not liable unless harm from
an event of the same general kind was foreseeable.' Finally, even though
a' Seideneck v. Bayreuther Associates, 451 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1970).
" Goodson v. Southland Corp., 454 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
n.r.e.
" Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc. v. Russell, 450 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ.
error ref. n.r.e.
'Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939);
Ry. v. McLain, 131 Tex. 484, 105 S.W.2d 206 (1939), on rehearing, 133
474 (1939).

Paso 1970), error ref.
App.-Houston 1970),
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Tex. 484, 126 S.W.2d
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both of the other requirements are met, under the substantive law, with
which I do not agree, a negligent defendant may be excused even though
the plaintiff was injured in the kind of event that was foreseeable, because
the conduct of someone else may be regarded as a new and independent
cause." This really means that because someone else may be regarded as
so much more to blame for the damaging event than the particular defendant, the latter ought not to be held responsible.
In Clark v. Waggoner"7 the defendant's automobile collided with the
rear of the plaintiff's automobile. The jury found that the defendant had
failed to keep a proper lookout because he had looked away to locate
house numbers prior to the collision. The jury then found that such negligence was not a proximate cause. The car that was rear-ended stopped
rather suddenly in response to a signal from a workman who was aiding
the maneuvering of a telephone pole over the street ahead. The trial court
rendered judgment against the defendant notwithstanding the finding
on proximate cause. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered
judgment for the defendant on the theory that foreseeability was not
shown as a matter of law,3" and the supreme court, with four judges dissenting, reinstated the trial court's judgment. Those who dissented said:
"[I]t was for the jury to say whether, under all the circumstances, a
person of ordinary prudence in respondent's position should have foreseen
that a momentary glance to the side would probably result in injuries or
damage to himself or others."" I submit that a momentary glance to the
side could not be negligence unless harm from such conduct was reasonably foreseeable, and this was precisely the way that it was likely to happen.
The need for keeping a lookout is because something might happen in
front requiring one to stop. I can understand how the jury might have
reached their result. In the light of the conduct of those working in the
street, and in the light of the charge to the jury on new and independent
causes, they could well have believed that harm coming about in this
precise way was not foreseeable or that the conduct of the workmen was
the sole proximate cause for the occurrence. However, since this was the
same general kind of accident that one would anticipate occurring from
failure to keep a lookout, i.e., a collision resulting from inability to stop in
time, it seems to me that the trial court's judgment was sound. Either
the ruling should be that there was no negligence as a matter of law, or
there should be liability.
Gross Negligence. The definition of gross negligence by the supreme
court in Harbin v. Seale' has been needed for some time. While both
negligence and gross negligence must necessarily be defined in somewhat
vague terms, there have been too many statements such as the following:
38

McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 153 S.W.2d 442 (1941); Paris & Great N. Ry.
v. Stafford, 53 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), judgment adopted.
a7452 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. 1970).
38446 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969).
39452 S.W.2d at 440.
4014 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 128 (1970).
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excessive speed alone cannot constitute gross negligence; a single dangerous
act not involving a persistent course of conduct cannot constitute gross
negligence.4' There are two main characteristics of gross negligence: conduct that constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care of a

reasonable man; and a conscious realization by the actor of the dangerousness of his conduct. The combination of the two elements constitute
cussedness, and, for cussedness, anyone ought to be held liable, criminally
and tortiously, under almost all circumstances. The supreme court makes

it clear that excessively high speed that causes so much death and destruction on the highway can be gross negligence.
V.

LIBEL AND SLANDER

Fair, true, and impartial accounts of most public meetings are qualifiedly privileged by statute. ' The case of Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd '
is an illustration of how easy it is for a reporter to get outside the area
of the privilege and subject himself and his employer to liability. In Boyd
the occasion for the newspaper report was a city council meeting. One
subject at the meeting was a request from a group of citizens involving
the subject of more paving of streets in a particular area of the city.
In making the report, the following statement was made: "The developer
of the area, D. B. Boyd, declared bankruptcy and didn't pave a total of
901 running feet of streets in the area.'" It was not disputed that the
statement was false, but the evidence was in conflict as to whether the
statement was made at the meeting or whether this was background information.' The court held that the failure to submit issues to resolve
two questions of fact relating to the privilege constituted a waiver of the
affirmative defense. The two issues were: (1) whether the ordinary reader
would have interpreted the statement as being made at the meeting; and
(2) whether the statement was or was not made at the meeting. It could
reasonably be argued that this being a privileged occasion, the burden of
proof should be on the plaintiff to show that the statement was one that
was not made at the meeting and that the privilege had been abused by
reporting on matters not discussed at the meeting. As the court stated,
it is clear that if the statement had been made at the meeting, the plaintiff
could not recover without proof that the statement was actuated by
malice. As a matter of fact, I would predict that the Supreme Court of
the United States will hold reports of public meetings to be absolutely
41 See Rogers v. Blake, 150 Tex. 373, 240 S.W.2d 1001 (1951); Bowman v. Puckett, 144 Tex.
125,4 2 188 S.W.2d 571 (1945); Rowan v. Allen, 134 Tex. 215, 134 S.W.2d 1022 (1940).
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5432 (1958).
4 448 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error granted.
44 Id. at 146.

" Itwas conceded on oral argument that the plaintiff was not a public figure. I must say that
the trend of the decisions by the United States Supreme Court is such as to cause me to believe
that he was. A contractor whose conduct or financial condition is reasonably related to the cre-

ation of a public issue under discussion and debate becomes, I suspect, a public figure with respect
to the particular matter at issue. This is an interesting question that will have to be resolved. It
could arise quite frequently in connection with background information related to issues discussed
at public meetings.
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privileged. The law of libel is being rewritten, and very little of what
has been the law will remain so after the constitutional guarantee of
free speech in relation to libel has been fully articulated by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler" the basis for a libel suit against the
defendant newspaper was the publication of a "letter to the editor" about
a professor at the University of Texas at El Paso who had led an antiVietnam war demonstration that aroused a considerable amount of inter-

est in the area. The letter, among other things, stated: "After reading
Dr. Trexler's remarks on the welfare state's being the ideal situation, I've
come to an EXTREME conclusion. Throw the bum out! There was a
time when rats paid the penalty for treason against our Republic. Today
they teach history in high schools and colleges, or are seated in the United
States Senate." 4" Prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4" the courts
in Texas and in a majority of jurisdictions held that a misstatement of
fact about a public figure to the general public was actionable without
respect to proof of fault."9 On the other hand, the courts had always
recognized a qualified privilege to comment on matters of public interest,
including the conduct of writers, professors, etc."' This latter privilege,
described as a privilege of fair comment, required that the courts attempt
to distinguish between expressions of opinion and misstatements of fact, 1
a distinction that resulted in a great deal of litigation. Moreover, the
privilege of fair comment was qualified in the sense that proof of malice
would subject the publisher to liability.' Malice could be established presumably by showing the existence of an improper motive or by showing
that the opinion was not honestly entertained by the publisher. 3 When
the Supreme Court interpreted the first amendment to give a qualified
privilege to publish defamatory misstatements of fact about public figures,
it required, as a basis for recovery, proof of malice in the sense of knowledge of the falsity of the imputation or with reckless disregard for the
truth." The existence of bad motive became immaterial. Such a result
seems to me to require a further change in the law. It would seem that
a derogatory opinion, no matter how unreasonable, can no longer serve
as a basis for recovery. The privilege of fair comment is, I suggest, an
absolute privilege, because if a misstatement of fact is not actionable
without proof of dishonesty, then the same test should be applied to the
circularization of an opinion. This means that the writer of a letter could
"447

47

S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 1969).

1d. at 404.

48376 U.S.
48

254 (1964).

See, e.g., Arizona Publishing Co. v. Harris. 20 Ariz. 446, 181 P. 373 (1919); Bell Publishing
Co. v. Garrett Eng'r Co., 141 Tex. 51, 170 S.W.2d 197 (1943).
"See, e.g., Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20
(1943); Moore v. Leverett, 52 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), holding approved.
51See, e.g., Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 376 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934).
5"See, e.g., Kulesza v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 311 111. App. 117, 35 N.E.2d 517 (1941);
Moore v. Leverett, 52 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), holding approved.
"aSee, e.g., Cohalan v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 Misc. 1061, 16 N.Y.S.2d 706
(1939).
5376

U.S. at 279-80.
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not be subject to liability beacuse of ill will, or hatred, or for some other
improper motive, but only for dishonesty. If the writer has an absolute
privilege, then the newspaper clearly has a privilege to print his opinion.
Conceivably, a court might hold that if plaintiff could prove that the defendant expressed an opinion which he did not entertain, his statement
would be actionable. However, this does not mean that the newspaper
would be liable. I predict the Supreme Court will hold that the privilege
to comment is an absolute one. Thus, I agree with the result in El Paso
Times v. Trexler, which was for the defendant. The court's holding was
that the evidence "does not show actual malice as defined in the New
York Times case." My reason would be the same reason that the employee of the newspaper gave for printing the letter. He said that he
would not have published the letter if he thought it accused the plaintiff
of treason in the technical, legal sense. He considered it as expressing an
extreme conclusion and an opinion of the letter-writer, and not a statement
of fact. The trial court in El Paso Times submitted the question of malice
to the jury and defined malice to mean publishing "with a desire or intent
to injure a person through a deliberate falsehood or with actual knowledge
of its probable falsity." ' If there had been a publication of a misstatement
of fact, I am inclined to disagree with plaintiff's counsel that this places
a greater burden on plaintiff than is required by New York Times.
In fact, it may be too favorable to the plaintiff, depending on what is
meant by "probable falsity." I think an honest belief in the existence of
the fact asserted will prevent it from being said that the defendant was
reckless. So, a person acts maliciously within the meaning of New York
Times if he publishes dishonestly, i.e., with knowledge of the falsity or
without an honest belief in its truth. A person could honestly believe that
another was a murderer even though he realized that there was an appreciable chance that he was mistaken.
VI.

RECAPTURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

It is the general rule that one entitled to possession of personal property
cannot use force against another to take possession of such property
unless the latter's possession was acquired unlawfully, i.e., tortiously or
criminally."' On the other hand, one entitled to possession is generally
entitled to trespass on the land of another to recapture property that is
being wrongfully withheld, especially after a request has been made to
surrender possession.s In North Side State Bank v. Hunter"' the court was
presented with a claim for damages by the owner and mortgagor of an
automobile against the mortgagee when an attempt at repossession culminated in a fight. The mortgage contract contained the usual stipulation
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giving the mortgagee the right to enter the owner's premises to reclaim.
This provision is valid, but only to the extent that this can be done without
the use of force against the person. Any provision in a contract authorizing
the use of force against another is illegal and contrary to public policy.
In such a situation, the law is that the mortgagor cannot use force against
the intruder to prevent the recapture, and the intruder cannot use force
against the mortgagor to effect the recapture. The first person, therefore,
to use force against the other is the aggressor, and the other would then
have a privilege of self-defense. It appears from such facts as were reported
in the opinion in Hunter that force was first used by the mortgagor to
prevent the taking of the car by confronting the agents of the mortgagee
with a gun. This was unprivileged and an actionable assault, if not a battery. The important question, not clearly answered, is whether the mortgagee or his agents should have withdrawn, if they could, or whether they
could stand ground and resist the force with such means as reasonably
appeared to be necessary. Arguably, the use of any unnecessary force
to effect withdrawal is to be regarded as the use of force to repossess rather
than the use of force in defense. These questions could not be answered
by the court of civil appeals in the light of the fact that appropriate issues
at the trial were not submitted. The case was remanded, but without
any instructions as to how the case should be submitted. It was submitted
on a negligence theory and in such a global manner as to fail to identify
for the jury the questions to which the substantive law requires answers.

